

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 March 1970

SUBJECT: Listing of Proposed Memoranda  
(Internal ONE Distribution Only)

This is a tentative set of suggestions -- not a firm program. A number of the items have already been discussed at Staff-Board/Panel sessions. We expect that some alternative or additional topics will be considered at such meetings in the next two or three weeks.

Chief, Estimates Staff

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 March 1970

SUBJECT: Proposed Topics for Memoranda


1. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS IN THE THIRD WORLD March

(The ONE consultants have commented on a draft of this paper and the Board has met on it once. A revised version with considerable new material is being prepared for consideration in a week or two.)



2. MODERN TECHNOLOGY: A REVOLUTION MAO HAS OVERLOOKED March

(How China is adapting or failing to adapt to the impact and requirements of modern technology. This paper would put some stress on military programs because (a) these are the most modern things in China, and (2) we know a little more about them than about most other programs.)



S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

3. THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN  
PERU

March/April



(We will try in this paper to define more clearly than we could in our December NIE the road this Peruvian Government is seeking to follow. At the same time, we will suggest what sort of developments might abruptly alter its course and what the implications for Peruvian-US relations might be.)



4. MEN OF THE 1970s IN EASTERN EUROPE

March/April

(This seeks to identify the coming political figures who will hold key, decision-making jobs, and considers how their attitudes and approaches might affect the course of developments in Eastern European countries and in relations with the USSR. More generally, it considers the whole matter of the likely influence of generational change in the area. We have had a preliminary meeting on the subject, received some inputs from other offices, and are thoroughly reworking the draft.)




S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

6. GREECE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNTA

April

(DIA asked that we do such a memorandum, citing an interest by J-5. It would cover Greece's relations with Western Europe -- including NATO -- and with Eastern Europe and the USSR, as well as the domestic political outlook to the mid-1970s.)



7. THE USSR: 1970

April


(We propose a broad review -- political, economic, and military -- of the past year, and a penetrating look at the year ahead.)



8. TRIBE AND STATE IN BLACK AFRICA

April/May

(In which the future of tribalism will be discussed in terms of national institutions and political stability. The paper will note some of the possible positive contributions of tribal orientation to African development, using examples from the major states.)




9. RUMANIA: ITS TROUBLED INTERNATIONAL POSITION

April/May

(This will consider the Rumanian's delicate stance, especially vis-a-vis the East; the problem of Soviet pressures; the regime's domestic position; the outlook.

S-E-C-R-E-T



S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

[ ] thinks a case can be made that  
Machiavelli is alive and well and living  
in Bucharest. J)

25X1

[ ]

10. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

May

(In which we examine the Soviet  
campaign, Moscow's motives, and the  
prospects for a conference. Would it  
do anything important if held? Would  
the very holding be important?)

25X1

[ ]

11. A POLITICAL GUIDE TO LEBANON IN 1970

May

(The Lebanese Government's efforts to  
keep fedayeen activity within bounds  
while avoiding trouble with activist  
Arab states are not only difficult but  
also add a major complicating factor  
to this year's presidential election.  
The half-dozen potential candidates will  
be seeking support from foreign as well  
as domestic sources, and there will be  
implications for the US.)

25X1

[ ]

12. THE TOLL OF TIME ON CHINA'S LEADERSHIP

May


(The 1970s will certainly see  
informity, if not mortality, strike  
heavily at China's top leaders. This  
paper would go beyond simply discussing  
Mao's longevity and the succession prob-  
lem, and would explore the implications

- 4 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

for China of an aging and dwindling band of top leaders and the possible impact on the power balance if other key leaders predecease Mao. Admittedly a little morbid and off-beat, but perhaps interesting, nevertheless.)



25X1

13. CUBA: POST-HARVEST PROBLEMS AND POLICIES

June


(By early June we should know the approximate size of the sugar harvest and should be in a much better position to assess the likely impact of success or failure than we were when we wrote the last Estimate on the subject [NIE 85-69, 2 September 1969]. This exercise may lead to a SNIE.)



25X1

14. WHERE ARE THE CHINESE MRBMs?

June



25X1

25X1

- 5 -

S-E-C-R-E-T